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Abstract: Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994)
as a reﬁnement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of
two person ﬁnite games. Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea
is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of equilibria of perturbed games. Here,
the perturbation has to do with the hypothetical possibility that the action of one the
players is revealed to his fellow player before the fellow player has to decide on his
own action. Whereas Robson models these perturbations in extensive form and uses
subgame perfection to solve these games, we model the perturbations in strategic form,
thus remaining in the class of bimatrix games. Moreover, within the perturbations we
impose two possible types of tie breaking rules, which leads to the notions optimistic
and pessimistic IRE.
The paper provides motivation on IRE and its deﬁnition. Several properties will be
discussed. In particular, we have that IRE is a strict concept, and that IRE components
are faces of Nash components. Speciﬁc results from potential games and matrix games
are obtained. Possibilities to extend the deﬁnition of IRE to more-person games are
proposed.
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11 Introduction
Through the years, a vast stream of literature on reﬁnements of the Nash equilibrium
concept based on the notion of perfectness as introduced by Selten (1975) has been de-
veloped. It culminated into the work of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), but not before
notions of properness (Myerson (1978)), strictly perfectness (Okada (1984)) and many
others had been introduced. An overview can be found in Van Damme (1991). The
original underlying idea of these concepts is that players undergo a thought experiment
in which all players make mistakes with small but positive probabilities. The current
paper is following a reﬁnement based on a similar but diﬀerent type of thought exper-
iment suggested by Robson (1994). Here, the idea is that there is a small but positive
probability that one of the players’ action is revealed (‘leakage of information’). Let us
elaborate on this idea by means of an example.






The row player has no direct inﬂuence on his payoﬀ by his own action. He can however
have the following line of thought:
”If there would be a slight chance that my opponent can act upon my action, then
I’d better play the top row; my opponent’s best reply to this action is playing the
left column. This leads to a beneﬁt of 1.”
It is not diﬃcult to provide contexts in which leakage of information is relevant, e.g. in
a poker game it is crucial to hide (the strength of) your hand, and in a ‘battle-of-the-
sexes’-game it is beneﬁcial to be able to reveal your action.
Our approach is very similar to the one of Robson; two person games are considered in
which the players act simultaneously. The main diﬀerences in the models are that we
restrict ourselves to games in which the players have ﬁnitely many pure strategies and
secondly we introduce two optional behavioral tie breaking rules, an optimistic and a
pessimistic one.
The games are perturbed by allocating small percentages to two (disjoint) events. With
large probability the original game is played. There is a small probability that one of
the players acts ﬁrst. If, say, player one acts ﬁrst, player two receives the information of
the decision of player one. If player one plays a mixed strategy, player two is informed
about the outcome of the chance mechanism. Thereafter, he can base his decision on
this information. Player one cannot distinguish between this case and the regular one,
i.e., he does not know if he is revealing his action or not.
4We refer to section 2 for the deﬁnition of a bimatrix game.
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Figure 1: The perturbation of Example 1 in extensive form
Similarly, player two may act ﬁrst (not knowing this himself) and player one can respond.
The events player one acts ﬁrst and player two acts ﬁrst do not necessarily have the same
probabilities.
To illustrate this setting, the extensive form of the perturbation of Example 1 is depicted
in Figure 1, in which "i denotes the probability that player i’s action is revealed to the
other player (i = 1;2).
Two-person games with ﬁnitely many pure strategies, or bimatrix games, in which play-
ers act simultaneously can be represented very eﬃciently in normal form. This is not
the case however for the perturbed games; e.g. if the players initially both have 3 pure
strategies, they both have 81 pure strategies in the perturbations. To avoid this expo-
nential growth, we will put restrictions on the behavior of the players in such a way
that the perturbed games have the same size as the original one. These restrictions are
based on the following. In a subgame in which a player must act secondly, he has full
information and the situation has the nature of a one-person game. We assume from a
rational player that he chooses a strategy that maximizes utility. To diminish the strat-
egy spaces, we delete all other strategies beforehand. In order to decrease the number
3of options in such a subgame to just one, we will either assume that the player chooses
a best strategy for himself that maximizes the payoﬀ to the other one (the optimistic
approach), or the player chooses a best strategy for himself that minimizes the payoﬀ
to the other (the pessimistic approach). If this setup still does not discriminate which
strategy will be played, we take an arbitrary remaining one; for both players it is of no
importance at all which it will be.
Now that we have established in this way that the perturbed games have the same size
as the original game, the deﬁnition of an informationally robust equilibrium becomes
straightforward. It is a proﬁle that is the limit of a series of equilibria of perturbed
games. We will formalize this concept in the next section.
Let us highlight the diﬀerences between the approaches of Robson (1994) and ours.
Robson considers ’two person games with simultaneous moves’. The set of pure strategies
of a players is assumed to be compact. The set of bimatrix games can be considered to
be the subclass of this type of games at which the pure strategy spaces of the players
are ﬁnite. Furthermore, Robson requires that the perturbed equilibria must be subgame
perfect. This requirement, translated to our setting, boils down to a commitment that
players must maximize their payoﬀ in each subgame in which they have full information,
even if the subgame is played with probability zero. Our behavioral approach is even
more restrictive, since the players must choose a particular optimal strategy.
The paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the ideas displayed in
this introduction and settles notations. Furthermore, it provides an alternative way
to describe informationally robustness (Lemma 4) and shows the non-emptiness and
closedness of the set of IRE (Theorem 5). Section 3 questions whether one of the
versions (optimistic vs. pessimistic) of IRE is superior to the other, section 4 deﬁnes the
notion of strict IRE and shows that it is coincides with IRE itself. The sections 6 and
7 deal with the classes of potential and matrix games respectively. Section 8 discusses
ways to generalize informationally robustness to n-person games.
2 IRE
Let us ﬁx the notations that are used throughout the paper. A bimatrix game is the
mixed extension of a ﬁnite two person noncooperative game. It is characterized by a pair
(A;B) of real valued matrices of equal, ﬁnite, size. The players are called one and two.
Player one chooses a row and player two chooses a column. We use m for the number
of rows and n for the number of columns. The index sets of the rows and columns are
denoted by M and N respectively:
M := f1;:::;mg and N := f1;:::;ng:
Typical characters to index rows are i and k, typical characters to index columns are j
and `. The spaces of mixed strategies are called ∆m and ∆n respectively. Furthermore,
4∆ := ∆m £ ∆n; the space of strategy proﬁles. The unit vectors of ∆m and ∆n (i.e.
the pure strategies) are denoted by ei (i 2 M) and fj (j 2 N). A typical element of




eiAq and PB2(B;p) := argmax
j2N
pBfj:
The correspondences are upper semi continuous in both coordinates, e.g. if (At;qt) tends
to (A;q), then PB1(At;qt) µ PB1(A;q) for suﬃciently large t.
The carrier C(x) of a vector x is the set of its non-zero coordinates, i.e.:
C(x) := fi j xi 6= 0g:
A Nash equilibrium (p;q) is a proﬁle of mixed strategies such that C(p) µ PB1(A;q)
and C(q) µ PB2(B;p). The set of all Nash equilibria of the game (A;B) is denoted by
E(A;B).
In principle, three extra parameters are needed to give the perturbations of A and B.
The probability that the action of player one is revealed to player two is called "1.
The probability that the action of player two is revealed to player one is called "2.
Furthermore, if the optimistic approach is chosen, the perturbations are labelled with a
+. If the pessimistic approach is chosen, they are labelled with a ¡. So, what will e.g.
A
+
ij("1;"2) be? It is the payoﬀ player one receives in an optimistically perturbed game
when player one chooses strategy ei and player two chooses fj. With large probability
(1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2) he receives the original amount Aij. With probability "1, player two
can respond optimal to ei. In the optimistic case he will play one of the strategies
f` 2 PB2(B;ei) that maximizes Ai`. With probability "2, player one can react optimally
against strategy fj of his opponent, resulting in maxk2M Akj. This leads to the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2: Let (A;B) be an m£n-bimatrix game and let "1 and "2 be positive real
numbers satisfying "1 + "2 < 1. The optimistic perturbed game (A+("1;"2);B+("1;"2))
is the bimatrix game given by:
A
+
ij("1;"2) := (1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2)Aij + "1 max




ij("1;"2) := (1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2)PBij + "1max
`2N Bi` + "2 max
k2PB1(A;fj) Bkj.
Similarly, the pessimistic perturbed game (A¡("1;"2);B¡("1;"2)) is deﬁned by:
A
¡
ij("1;"2) := (1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2)Aij + "1 min




ij("1;"2) := (1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2)Bij + "1max
`2N Bi` + "2 min
k2PB1(A;fj) Bkj.
We now have made all preparations to deﬁne informationally robust equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3: Let (A;B) be an m£n-bimatrix game. A proﬁle (p;q) is an optimistic
informationally robust equilibrium or IRE
+ if there exist sequences ("t
1)t2IN and ("t
2)t2IN
5of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence (pt;qt)t2IN in ∆ converging














Similarly, a proﬁle (p;q) is an pessimistic informationally robust equilibrium or IRE
¡ if
there exist sequences ("t
1)t2IN and ("t
2)t2IN of positive real numbers converging to zero,


















Let us give an alternative, convenient characterization of IRE
+ and IRE
¡ by means of
best reply equivalent perturbed games. Two bimatrix games (A;B) and (C;D) of equal
size are called best reply equivalent if their pure best reply functions coincide:
PB1(A;¢) = PB1(C;¢) and PB2(B;¢) = PB2(D;¢):
We will denote this type of equivalence by (A;B) ´b (C;D).
Fix an m £ n-bimatrix game (A;B). Let R+ and R¡ 2 IR

















The alternative perturbations of A and B will be:
A+("1) := A + "1R+;
B+("2) := B + "2S+ and
A¡("1) := A + "1R¡;
B¡("2) := B + "2S¡:
Lemma 4: Let (A;B) be an m£n-bimatrix game. A proﬁle (p;q) is IRE
+ if and only
if there exist sequences ("t
1)t2IN and ("t
2)t2IN of positive real numbers converging to zero,










Similarly, a proﬁle (p;q) is IRE
¡ if and only if there exist sequences ("t
1)t2IN and ("t
2)t2IN
of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence (pt;qt)t2IN in ∆ converging










6Proof: We will only prove this result for the optimistic case; the other case can be
proved similarly. Let "1; "2 > 0. Best reply equivalent games have identical equilibrium
sets. Since the deﬁnition of IRE
+ concerns equilibrium sets of perturbed games, we
might as well use other perturbations as long as they are best reply equivalent. It is
easy to verify that (A;B) and (tA;uB) are best reply equivalent for any positive real
numbers t and u, and so are (A;B) and (A + T;B + U) if T is a matrix with constant
columns and U is a matrix with constant rows. When deﬁning T;U 2 IR
M£N by:
Tij := "2max







2)) = ((1 ¡ "t
1 ¡ "t
2)A + "t
1R+ + T;(1 ¡ "t
1 ¡ "t
2)B + "t





































. Then one might as well use the
sequences (²t
1)t2IN and (²t




Let us apply the previous lemma to Example 1 from the introduction. The game
(A+("1;"2);B+("1;"2)) is given by:

















(1 ;1 ) ("1;"1 + 2"2)
(1 ¡ "1;2"1 + "2) (0;2 )
¸
;
and the alternative perturbation (A + "1R+;B + "2S+) is:
·
(1 + "1;1 + "2) ("1; 2"2)
(1 ; "2) (0;2 + 2"2)
¸
:
The following theorem is a special case of Theorem 3 of Robson (1994). Because of our
diﬀerent approach and notations and its plainness, we include a proof.
Theorem 5: Let (A;B) be a bimatrix game. Then IRE
+(A;B) and IRE
¡(A;B) are
non-empty and closed subsets of E(A;B).
Proof: Like the proof of Lemma 4, we only give the optimistic part of the proof. Firstly,
we show the non-emptyness. Let ("t
1)t2IN and ("t
2)t2IN be rows converging to 0. Let for all
t in IN: (pt;qt) 2 E(A+("t
1);B+("t
2)). Because of the compactness of the strategy spaces,
there exists a pair of subsequences converging to, say, (p;q) 2 ∆, which is thereby by
deﬁnition 3 and Lemma 4 an element of IRE
+(A;B).
7To show that (p;q) 2 IRE
+(A;B) is an equilibrium, we have to show that C(p) µ
PB1(A;q) and C(q) µ PB2(B;p). Obviously, it suﬃces to prove the ﬁrst statement.
Take sequences ("t
1;"t
2) converging to (0;0) and (pt;qt) 2 E(A+("t
1);B+("t
2)) converging
to (p;q). Let i 2 C(p). Then for suﬃciently large t we have that i 2 C(pt). Hence,
eiA+("t
1)qt > ekA+("t
1)qt for all k 2 M.
Taking t to inﬁnity, we ﬁnd:
eiAq > ekAq for all k 2 M.
Finally, we show the closedness of IRE
+(A;B). Take a converging sequence (pt;qt)t2IN
in IRE
+(A;B) with limit (p;q). For every t, there are sequences ("tk
1 ;"tk
2 )k2IN converging










Consider the sequences ("tt
1;"tt
2)t2IN and (ptt;qtt)t2IN. They demonstrate that (p;q) is an
IRE
+. ¤
3 Optimistic or pessimistic?
In order to get more aquainted with IRE we give two examples. The ﬁrst one shows that
the optimistic and pessimistic approaches can lead to diﬀerent outcomes. The optimistic
approach selects the Pareto optimal equilibrium, while the pessimistic approach selects
the (unique) perfect equilibrium.











(1 + "1;0) (1 + "1;1 + "2) (2 + "1; "2)
( 2"1;1) (1 + 2"1; "2) (2 + 2"1;1 + "2)
¸
:
Regardless the values of "1 and "2, the ﬁrst column is strictly dominated by the third








(1 + "1;0) (1 + "1;1) (2 + "1;0)
(0 ;1) (1 ;0) (2 ;1)
¸
:
We ﬁnd that IRE(A;B)¡ = f(e1;f2)g.
The following example shows that two best reply equivalent games can have diﬀerent
IRE’s. As one might have observed at Example 1 in the introduction, best reply equiv-
alence is in our opinion not so innocent.


















. The equilibrium set of
both games equals (fe1g £ [f1;f2]) [ ([e1;e2] £ ff2g). Since the payoﬀ to player two is
independent on his own decision, one might have the opinion that he can play arbitrarily
and should not invest time or eﬀort in his decisions.
However, if there is pre-play communication, in the game (A;B) he could try to convince
player one that it is proﬁtable to play the top row. A pessimistic player would therefore
announce to play the left column. An optimistic player two would not bother; he would
think that player one plays the top row anyhow.
In the game (A;B0), player two could try to convince player one that there is no use
in playing the top row, because he (player two) plays the right column. If player two
succeeds, player one becomes indiﬀerent and can play anything. An optimistic player
two would therefore announce to play the right column. A pessimistic player two would
not bother.
If there is no pre-play communication, but player two takes a slight probability into
account that player one can react on his decisions, he should play, in our opinion, f1 in
the game (A;B) and f2 in the game (A;B0).
The IRE concept rather closely comports with the above ideas. It is easy to verify that:
IRE
+(A;B) = fe1g £ [f1;f2];
IRE





In the game (A;B), the pessimistic approach selects in our opinion the most natural
outcome. In the game (A;B0) however, this is established by the optimistic approach.
Even though the approaches lead to diﬀerent outcomes, most results in the paper hold
for both the pessimistic and the optimistic version of IRE. Moreover, many proofs
hardly rely on which of the approaches is chosen. If so, we omit the ﬂag + or ¡. Hence,
whenever we use the notation IRE, one of the options IRE
+ or IRE
¡ is meant. Similarly,
ﬂags on matrices are omitted if it does not matter which option is treated.
4 Strict IRE
Like Robson (1994), we allowed the probabilities with which the respective players act
ﬁrst to be unequal. It will turn out that if we do require equal probabilities, this will
not change the set of informationally robust equilibria. We can go even further; if there
is some sequence of perturbed games making some proﬁle an IRE, then any sequence
of perturbed games converging to the original game supports this proﬁle being an IRE.
This section proves the above statement. Firstly, the notion of strict IRE is deﬁned,
analogously to the way Okada (1984) has reﬁned perfectness to strict perfectness.
9Deﬁnition 8: An equilibrium (p;q) of game (A;B) is called strict IRE if for all
decreasing sequences ("t
1;"t
2)t2IN converging to (0;0) there is a sequence (pt;qt)t2IN con-




2)) for all t 2 IN.
Theorem 9: For any bimatrix game (A;B) the sets of IRE and strict IRE coincide.
Proof: Obviously strict IRE is a (weakly) stronger property than IRE, so it is suﬃces
to show that any informationally robust equilibrium is strict. Let (p;q) be an IRE,
with corresponding decreasing rows of perturbations (±t
1)t2IN and (±t
2)t2IN. Let the row
of corresponding equilibria be (pt;qt)t2IN. By using subsequences we can establish that
C(p) µ C(pt) = C(pt0) and C(q) µ C(qt) = C(qt0) for all t;t0 2 IN. Take an arbitrary
decreasing sequence ("t
1;"t
2)t2IN converging to (0;0).






























2 + (1 ¡ ¹)±
t
2:
Deﬁne the proﬁle (ˆ pT; ˆ qT) by:
ˆ p
T := ¹p
1 + (1 ¡ ¹)p
t and ˆ q
T := ¸q
1 + (1 ¡ ¸)q
t:
Clearly, it suﬃces to show that (ˆ pT; ˆ qT) 2 E(A("T
1);B("T
2)). Because of the similarity,
we only show that C(ˆ pT) µ PB1(A("T
1); ˆ qT). Take i 2 C(ˆ pT).
Because C(ˆ pT) = C(p1) = C(pt) and (p1;q1) 2 E(A(±1
1);B(±1
















in which r 2 IR
























for all k 2 M. Hence, ˆ pT is a best response to ˆ qT in the game (A + "T
1R;B + "T
2S). ¤
Because IRE and strict IRE coincide, one might as well only look at the perturbations:
(A(");B(")) = (A + "R;B + "S):
Corollary 10: (p;q) 2 IRE(A;B) if and only if it is the limit of some trajectory
(p";q")"#0 with (p";q") 2 E(A + "R;B + "S).
105 The structure of IRE
In bimatrix games, the set of Nash equilibria is the union of ﬁnitely many Nash compo-
nents (Jansen (1981)) . We show that IRE(A;B) can be decomposed in the same way.
Extreme points of such a component are extreme points of some Nash component. Not
all Nash components contain IRE’s and sometimes two IRE components are situated in
the same Nash component.
Deﬁnition 11: Let (A;B) be a bimatrix game. A set G of proﬁles is called an IRE
component if:
(i) G is a convex subset of IRE(A;B),
(ii) G is a product set, i.e. G = G1 £ G2 for some G1 µ ∆m, G2 µ ∆n.
(iii) G is maximal with respect to properties (i) and (ii),
If we replace IRE(A;B) by E(A;B) in the previous deﬁnition, we obtain the deﬁnition
of a Nash component. Jansen (1981) has shown that Nash components are polytopes
and that there are ﬁnitely many of them. We will show the same for IRE components
with the help of the following claim.
Claim 12: Let (p;q) be an informationally robust equilibrium of the game (A;B). Let
(p0;q0) be an element of the relative interior of the smallest face of the Nash component
in which (p;q) is situated. Then (p0;q0) 2 IRE as well.
Because IRE is a closed set, we might as well omit the presumption that (p0;q0) is situated
in the relative interior. However, presuming it gives that the carriers and best reply sets
concerning p and p0 coincide (see e.g. Jurg (1993), x2.2).
Proof: Because a component is the cartesian product of two polytopes, (p0;q) is situated
on the same face as (p;q) and (p0;q0) do. Without loss of generality we assume that q
equals q0, since if we can prove that (p0;q) 2 IRE, we can repeat the argument for (p0;q0),
given that (p0;q) 2 IRE.
Inside the relative interior of the face of a Nash component the carrier C(¢) and pure
best reply correspondence PB2(B;¢) are constant. Hence, we have C(p) = C(p0) and
PB2(B;p) = PB2(B;p0). Furthermore, there is a decreasing sequence ("t)t2IN with limit
0 and a series of proﬁles (pt;qt)t2IN converging to (p;q) such that (pt;qt) is an equilibrium
of the game (A("t);B("t)). For all t, deﬁne:
ˆ p
t := p
0 ¡ p + p
t:



















11and if ˆ pt
i < 0, then i 2 C(p) = C(p0), so p0
i > 0. Hence, increasing t suﬃciently will lead
to a positive value of ˆ pt
i.
The proof is complete when we can show that (ˆ pt;qt) 2 E(A("t);B("t)). We have:
C(ˆ p
t) µ C(p












Because pure best reply correspondences are upper semi continuous (see section 2), for








Combining these statements gives:
fj;`g µ PB2(B;p) = PB2(B;p0):
This implies that:
pBf` = pBfj and ¡ p
0Bf` = ¡p
0Bfj: (4)
















Hence, like `, the strategy j is an element of PB2(B("t); ˆ pt). We conclude that (ˆ pt;qt)
is an element of E(A("t);B("t)). ¤
Claim 12 and the fact that IRE(A;B) is a closed set lead to the observation that IRE
components behave like Nash components. We have established the following result:
Theorem 13: The IRE components of a bimatrix game (A;B) are faces of its Nash
components. They are thereby polytopes and there are ﬁnitely many of them.
6 Potential games
Potential games have been introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). There are many
economic situations that can be modelled by potential games. For an overview we refer
to Voorneveld (1999). The main virtue of having a potential function for a ﬁnite game is
that it implies the existence of an (easily traceable) Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
12Perhaps the most natural deﬁnition of a potential is the cardinal (or exact) potential
function. On the other hand, the ordinal potential generalizes this concept to a much
wider class of games and can still be used to obtain the result of this section. Therefore,
we give the deﬁnition of the latter type of potential:
Deﬁnition 14: A bimatrix game (A;B) is an ordinal potential game if there exists a
function P : ∆ ¡! IR such that for all p;p0 2 ∆m and q;q0 2 ∆n:
pAq > p0Aq if and only if P(p;q) > P(p0;q)
pBq > pBq0 if and only if P(p;q) > P(p;q0).
and
The function P is called an (ordinal) potential of the game (A;B).
It turns out that IRE and the set of strategy pairs at which the potential is maximal
always have a proﬁle in common.
Theorem 15: Let (A;B) be a bimatrix game with ordinal potential P. Then there
exists a pure informationally robust equilibrium that maximizes the potential.
Proof: Deﬁne the m £ n-matrix ¯ P as the restriction of P to the pure strategy proﬁles
of (A;B):
¯ Pij := P(ei;fj): (i 2 M; j 2 N)
By the deﬁnition of a potential, for all i;k 2 M and all j;` 2 N:
Aij > Akj () ¯ Pij > ¯ Pkj
Bij > Bi` () ¯ Pij > ¯ Pi`: (6)
Let us call a matrix satisfying (6) a potential matrix. Firstly, we show that the pertur-
bation (A + "R;B + "S) has potential matrix ¯ P + "(R + S) if " is chosen suﬃciently
small. Let i;k 2 M and j 2 N. If Aij = Akj, then ¯ Pij = ¯ Pkj and therefore:
(A + "R)ij > (A + "R)kj () ( ¯ P + "R)ij > ( ¯ P + "R)kj: (7)
If Aij > Akj, then ¯ Pij > ¯ Pkj and we can choose " suﬃciently small to obtain the validity
of the statements (A+"R)ij > (A+"R)kj and ( ¯ P +"R)ij > ( ¯ P +"R)kj in (7). Similarly,
(7) holds when Aij < Akj and " is suﬃciently small (switch the roles of i and k). Because
S has constant columns we have Sij = Skj, making (7) equivalent with:
(A + "R)ij > (A + "R)kj () ( ¯ P + "R + "S)ij > ( ¯ P + "R + "S)kj:
Similarly, for all i 2 M and all j;k 2 N and suﬃciently small ":
(B + "S)ij > (B + "S)i` () ( ¯ P + "R + "S)ij > ( ¯ P + "R + "S)i`:
13Hence, the perturbations have potential matrices as well. It is easy to infer that a pure
strategy proﬁle maximizing a potential matrix is a Nash equilibrium. There are ﬁnitely
many pure proﬁles, so for any sequence of perturbed games converging to (A;B), there
exists a subsequence of it and a pure proﬁle (ei;fj) such that (ei;fj) is a ‘potential
matrix maximizer’ in all games in the subsequence. Since the potential matrices of the
perturbed games converge to ¯ P, (ei;fj) is a pure IRE maximizing the potential P. ¤
Remark 16: A function P : ∆ ¡! IR is called a cardinal or exact potential of (A;B)
if for all p;p0 2 ∆m and all q;q0 2 ∆n we have:
pAq ¡ p0Aq = P(p;q) ¡ P(p0;q) and pBq ¡ pBq0 = P(p;q) ¡ P(p;q0):
In the case that P is a cardinal potential, then P is the multilinear extension of ¯ P. Along
the lines of the proof of Theorem 15 it can be shown that the multilinear extension of
( ¯ P + "(R + S)) is a cardinal potential of (A + "R;B + "S).
In general, not all potential maximizers survive. In the following cardinal potential game,
the set of potential maximizers is the union of two line segments. In the pessimistic
version of IRE, the three pure equilibria survive:











. Then E(A;B) = ([e1;e2]£ff1g)[(fe1g£ [f1;f2]). All equilibria
maximize P. The perturbed game (A¡(");B¡(")) =
·
(2 + ";2 + ") (1 + ";2 + 2")
(2 + 2";1 + ") ( 2"; 2")
¸
has potential matrix P + "(R¡ + S¡) =
·
1 + 2" 1 + 3"
1 + 3" 4"
¸
. It has three Nash equilibria:
(e1;f2), (e2;f1) and ((1 ¡ ")e1 + "e2;(1 ¡ ")f1 + "f2).
7 Matrix games
A matrix game is a bimatrix game (A;B) with B = ¡A. It is customary to denote
such a game by A. Two-person zero-sum games can be considered to be the utmost
noncooperative games, since any action of an agent motivated by an increase of utility,
automatically leads to a corresponding decrease of utility to the other one. There appears
to be no room at all for negotiation which proﬁle (equilibrium) should be played. Still,
there is support to play Nash equilibria, without introducing prior beliefs concerning the
opponents plans. The equilibrium set of a matrix game has a product structure, i.e.,
if (p;q) and (p0;q0) are equilibria, then so are (p0;q) and (p;q0). This justiﬁes speaking
about an equilibrium strategy rather than an equilibrium proﬁle. This section shows
that IRE(A) is, like the Nash set, a product set, so we can consider informationally
14robust strategies. It is, again like the Nash set, a polytope, and an element of it can be
found in polynomial time.
In the zero-sum case, the optimistic and the pessimistic view coincide, because playing a
best response determines the payoﬀ to the other player. A+("1;"2) and A¡("1;"2) both
equal the zero-sum game deﬁned by (i 2 M; j 2 N):
A("1;"2)ij := (1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2)Aij + "1min
`2N Ai` + "2max
k2M Akj:
The matrices R+ and R¡ also coincide in a zero-sum game. We denote:
Rij := max
`2PB2(¡A;ei) Ai` = min`2N Ai` (i 2 M)
Similarly:
Sij := max




Akj (j 2 N)
By Lemma 4 one might as well consider the disturbed game:
(A + "1R;¡A + "2S):
This game is strategically equivalent with the zero-sum game:
(A + "1R ¡ "2S):
Finally, because IRE and strict IRE coincide, one might as well consider the disturbed
game:
A + "(R ¡ S):
Let r 2 IR
M be any column of R (they are identical) and let s 2 IR
N be any row of S.
Theorem 18: Let A be a matrix representing a zero-sum game. Let O(A)1 and O(A)2
be the polytopes of optimal strategies of players one and two respectively. Then IRE(A)
is a product set, i.e. it can be decomposed: IRE(A) = IO(A)1 £ IO(A)2. IRE(A)1 is
the face of O(A)1 at which the linear function:
O(A)1 ¡! IR; p 7! hp;ri
is maximized.
Similarly, IO(A)2 is the face of O(A)2 at which the linear function:
O(A)2 ¡! IR; q 7! h¡s;qi
is minimized.
The proof is based on the following idea. We have seen that IRE(A) µ E(A). It appears
that the primal concern of a player is to play an optimal strategy of the original game
A. The term "R is of secondary concern to player one. Hence, he should, within his
Nash polytope, maximize this term. The term ¡"S has no strategic inﬂuence to player
one since the columns of S are constant.
Because of its technical nature the proof has been postponed to the appendix. It requires












aim at left corner:
aim at right corner:
just kick ﬁrmly:
dive to the left











Figure 2: A penalty shot
The nature of zero-sum games supports the reﬁnement of informationally robustness.
For instance, it reduces the harm ’not having a poker face’ can have, or the disutility
that occurs if it is possible to be ’cheaten’ with small probabilities. Let us give as an
illustration a situation in which IRE selects in our opinion the proﬁle that ﬁts best with
the context.
Example 19: Consider a situation in which a penalty shot has been assigned to a
soccer team. Let us give the forward who has to shoot three options; he can aim at the
left corner, the right corner or he can just give a ﬁrm kick. If the forward is skilled, it is
obvious that the best thing to do is aim at a corner. If his aiming is poor however and
he faces an excellent keeper, he’d better shoot ﬁrmly and hope for the best. The keeper
has three pure strategies as well: dive to the left (from the perspective of the forward),
dive to the right or stand still and react on the shot.
In our example, depicted in Figure 2, the forward is moderate and we have designed
the ﬁgures such that he has various optimal strategies. Because the forward cannot aim
perfectly, the ﬁgures in the matrix do not represent certain outcomes, but expectations.
The keeper has one optimal strategy: q := 1
2(f1 + f2). The forward has two extreme
optimal strategies: p1 := 1
2(e1 + e2) and p2 := 1
6(e1 + e2 + 4e3). Which one is better?
In spite of the fact that p2 is weakly dominated by p1, the concept of IRE recommends
p2. In the spirit of the concept, p2 should be played according to the following lines of
thought of the forward:
”Suppose the keeper can see which corner I am aiming at. Then my chances reduce.
On the other hand, if the keeper can see I go for the ﬁrm kick, this information is
of less value to him.”
By using Theorem 18 it is easy to infer that (p2;q) is indeed the only informationally
robust equilibrium; any row r of R equals (¡1;¡1;¡1
2) and ¡1 = hr;p1i < hr;p2i = ¡2
3.
168 The n-person case
It is not straightforward how to generalize the concept of information robustness to
games with more than two players, i.e. n-matrix games. We give three options:
(i) Each player, but at most one at a time, hears with a small possibility the strategies
of all of his opponents. The player can adapt his decision to a (speciﬁc) best
response.
(ii) Each player, but at most one at a time, reveals with a small possibility his strategy
to all of his opponents. The others play an (n-1)-person game thereafter.
(iii) For each ordered pair of players (i;j), there is a slight chance that i ﬁnds out the
action of player j.
The practical advantage of the ﬁrst option is that the perturbed games are n-matrix
games as well, with the size of the original game. Furthermore, we can again distinguish
between an optimistic and a pessimistic approach. It takes too far to elaborate the
n-person case in this paper. It is an interesting subject for future research. We will
restrict ourselves to one example in which we choose the ﬁrst of the three options. The
optimistic approach is able to make a strict selection of the equilibrium set.
Example 20: There are three players, each of them takes either 1 or 2 coins in his
hand. If a player chooses diﬀerently from the others, he receives the number he has
chosen.
The story can be depicted by the following scheme:
(1;1) (1;2) or (2;1) (2;2)
1 coin 0 0 1
2 coins 2 0 0
The rows represent the two actions of a player (1 coin or 2 coins). The columns represent
the combined actions of the opponents. There are seven ’Nash components’. Six of them







and f(p;p;p)g, in which p = ¸e1 + (1 ¡ ¸)e2 and ¸ is the root in [0;1] of the expression
x2 + 2x ¡ 1 = 0, i.e. ¸ =
p
2 ¡ 1.
Let us assume that each agent hears the strategies of the other players with a probability
", and with probability 1¡3" nobody hears anything. What will be the optimistic payoﬀ
scheme? If A 2 IR
2£2£2 is the trimatrix of player one, his perturbed payoﬀ trimatrix
will be given by (i;j;k 2 f1;2g):
(1 ¡ 3")Aijk + "( max
`2f1;2g
A`jk) + "( max
`2PB2(B;ei;gk)
Ai`k) + "( max
`2PB3(ei;fj)
Aij`):
17The optimistic payoﬀ scheme becomes:
(1;1) (1;2) or (2;1) (2;2)
1 coin 2" " 1
2 coins 2 2" "
.
Four equilibria survive: (e1;f2;g2);(e2;f1;g2);(e2;f2;g1) and (p;p;p).
The pessimistic payoﬀ scheme will be:
(1;1) (1;2) or (2;1) (2;2)
1 coin 2" 0 1 ¡ 2"




In order to prove Theorem 18, a result is needed from Linear Algebra, providing suﬃcient
conditions for convergence of solution sets of perturbed systems of linear equations:
Claim 21: Let D be an m£n-matrix and let (dt)t2IN be a sequence in IR
m converging
to d. Let for all t in IN, F t ½ IR
n be the set of feasible points of the system of equations
fx 2 IR
n
+ j Dx = dtg. Let F be the set of feasible points of fx 2 IR
n
+ j Dx = dg. Suppose
there exists a uniform bound M 2 IN, i.e. kxk 6 M for all x 2
S
F t. If all solution sets
F t are non-empty, then F t converges to F in the sense that:
(i) if ˆ xt 2 F t for all t 2 IN and lim
t!1
ˆ x
t = ˆ x, then ˆ x 2 F,
(ii) for all ˆ x 2 F there exists a sequence (ˆ xt)t2IN in (F t)t2IN converging to ˆ x.
Proof: It is easy to infer statement (i) by a continuity argument. The diﬃcult part is
to show that any element of F is the limit of some sequence in (F t)t2IN. The proof will
be by induction to n; the number of columns. The case n = 1 is left to the reader.
We distinguish between two cases:
Case I: There exists a strictly positive element s 2 IR
n
++ of F.
Linear operations like adding rows to others, or multiplying a row with a non-zero
number will not change the solutions sets, nor the feature that the constraint vectors
converge. Hence, without loss of generality, D has an echelon form: D =
·
Ir M
¯ 0 ¯ 0
¸
, in
which r is the rank of D, Ir is an identity matrix, M is some matrix with r rows and
n ¡ r columns and the zeros represent zero matrices.
Because F t 6= Á for all t 2 IN, we have that di = dt
i = 0 for all t 2 IN and all i > r.
Hence, we might as well remove the m¡r zero-rows of D, which boils down to assuming
that D is of full rank: r = m.
18Let q := (d1;:::;dm;0;:::;0) 2 IR
n. Then Dq = d. Similarly, let qt := (dt;¯ 0) 2 IR
n, so
Dqt = dt. Deﬁne st := s + qt ¡ q. Let ± > 0 be such that si > ± for all i 6 n. Then
st
i > 1
2± for large t and i 6 n.
Let ˆ x be any element of F. Deﬁne ˆ xt := ˆ x + qt ¡ q. Then Dˆ xt = dt and ˆ xt ¡! ˆ x. Let
¸t := minf¸ 2 [0;1] j ¸st + (1 ¡ ¸)ˆ xt > ¯ 0g and deﬁne ˜ xt := ¸tst + (1 ¡ ¸t)ˆ xt 2 F t.
Let " > 0. Choose t so large that ˆ xt














. Since ± is ﬁxed and " can be chosen to be as small as desired, ¸t tends to 0. Hence,
kˆ x ¡ ˜ xtk¡!
t!10. This ends Case I.
Case II: For some i 6 n, xi = 0 for all x 2 F.
Without loss of generality, choose i = n. Let ±
t := min
x2Ft xn. Let ± be an accumulation
point of (±t)t2IN. Because of the uniform bound M, there exists a row xt1;xt2;xt3;:::
converging to, say, x with xtk
n = ±tk and lim
k!1
±








Substitute, for all t 2 IN, xn = ±t in the equation set Dx = dt. The solution sets may
become smaller, but remain non-empty. By now, the right column can be removed from
all sets of equations and obtain a setting with one dimension less. Hence, we can apply
the induction hypothesis. For an arbitrary element ˆ x = (ˆ x1;:::; ˆ xn¡1;0) of F, we can
give an element (ˆ xt
1;:::; ˆ xt
n¡1;±t) in F t close to ˆ x. ¤
Notice that if the constraint matrix D is perturbed as well, convergence is not guar-
anteed. E.g. if Dt :=
·
1 ¡ 1
t 1 + 1
t
1 + 1








, the solution sets of F t all equal
f(1;1)g, while the solution set of F equals f(x;2 ¡ x) : x 2 [0;2]g.
Proof of Theorem 18: Because for every " > 0, E(A+"(R¡S)) is a product set and
a polytope and because IRE(A) coincides with strict IRE(A) (Theorem 9), IRE(A) is
a product set and a polytope as well, say IRE(A) = IO(A)1 £IO(A)2 µ ∆m £∆n. The
assertions concerning IO(A)1 and IO(A)2 are so similar that we suﬃce with the proof
of the latter. Assume without loss of generality that A > 0. Then R is as well a strictly
positive matrix and S is a strictly negative matrix. Furthermore, v(A), the value of the
game, is strictly positive. Let ("t)t2IN be a decreasing row with limit 0.
O(A + "t(R ¡ S))2 is the set of optimal solutions of the linear program:
minimize v subject to:
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1




































19The left column will be referred to as column v, the top row as row 0 and each other
row by its corresponding pure strategy: row i (i 2 M).
If we would like to apply the Simplex method, for each row a slack variable has to be
added, except for row 0, since
P









v 2 IR+; q 2 IR
N








0 1 ¢¢¢ ¢¢¢ 1 0 ¢¢¢0
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Here, ev denotes the unit vector of IR £ IR
N £ IR
M corresponding to v and Im denotes
the m £ m identity matrix. By adding row 0 of the table "tri times to row i (i 2 M),
the table becomes independent of the matrix R, except for the constraint vector. The















0 1 ¢¢¢ 1 0 ¢¢¢ 0
1





























Denote the constraint matrix in the program LP t by Dt. The program and constraint
matrix obtained by substituting "t := 0, will be called LP and D respectively. They
correspond to the non-perturbed game A.














Let us recall the features of the Simplex method that are important for our purpose.




+ is nonnegative and the sum of the original
object vector ev and some linear combination of the rows of LP t. The main principle of
the Simplex method is, that one might as well optimize the ﬁnal object vector, because
for any row Dt
i¢, the inner product hDt
i¢;xi is independent on x (as long as x is chosen
feasible). The set of optimal points consists of all feasible points with inner product zero
with the ﬁnal object vector.
Because the tables consists of linear equations, we can normalize them such that for all
t 2 IN, all numbers in Bt, bt and at are in some compact segment, e.g. [¡1;1]. Hence,
by taking a suitable subsequence of the row ("t)t2IN, we can accomplish that Bt, bt and
at converge to, say, B, b and a respectively. This limit (minimize ha;xi s.t. Bx = b)
5The | denotes that the vector is transposed
20is a table for the original game and could have been obtained by applying the Simplex
method on LP. Hence, a equals ev plus some linear combination of the rows of LP:
a = ev +
m X
i=0
ciDi¢ for some c 2 IR£ IR
M: (10)
Because v(A) is strictly positive, we have that xv = v(A) > 0 for all optimal points, so
av = 0. Focussing at the ﬁrst column of LP, equation (10) gives:
0 = av = (ev)v +
m X
i=0




We have that at
i > 0 for large t and all i 2 C(a). Hence, all variables corresponding to
elements of C(a) have value 0 in any optimal point and all corresponding columns can
be removed6 from the tables LP t and LP without changing optimal sets: columns in
C(a)\M correspond to pure strategies on which player one can put some weight while
playing optimal in the original game A and columns in C(a) \ N correspond to pure
strategies on which player two does not put positive weight in any equilibrium of A.
Denote the complement of the carrier of a by Z(a) (the ’zero part’ of a):
Z(a) := fi : ai = 0g:
Denote the matrices Dt and D of which the redundant columns have been deleted by
¯ Dt and ¯ D respectively. Similarly, let ¯ ev := (1;0;:::;0) 2 IR
Z(a) be the ﬁrst unit vector
of IR
Z(a), let ¯ s 2 IR
Z(a) be the restriction of the vector (0;s;0;:::;0) 2 IR£ IR
N £ IR
M
and let ¯ at be the restriction of at (so ¯ at = ¯ 0 for all t). We can omit these columns as
well in equation (10):






















t¯ s = (¡1) ¢ "
t¯ s:
To infer the second equality, consider program LP t, (table (8)): the diﬀerence between
row i of LP t and row i of LP is "t times the vector (0;s;0;:::;0) for all i > 1. For the
right equality we refer to (11). Hence, for all t 2 IN, in stead of minimizing h¯ ev;xi, we
might as well minimize h¡"t¯ s;xi, or h¡¯ s;xi.
Call the alternative optimization problem ALP t:









6the removed variables of course still have to be stored and are set to be zero
21Let us repeat the results so far. For all t 2 IN, the set O(A+"t(R¡S))2 is described by
ALP t in the sense that for all q 2 ∆n, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) q 2 O(A + "t(R ¡ S))2 and
(ii) qj = 0 for all j 2 N \ C(a) and qj = xj for all j 2 N \ Z(a) and some optimal
solution x 2 IR
Z(a)
+ of ALP t.
Consequently, the program obtained by substituting "t := 0 in ALP t will be called ALP.
The set of feasible points of ALP corresponds to O(A)2 in the sense that for all q 2 ∆n:
q 2 O(A)2 if and only if qj = 0 for all j 2 N \ C(a) and qj = xj for all j 2 N \ Z(a)
and some feasible point x 2 IR
Z(a)
+ of ALP. The optimal set of ALP corresponds to the
face of O(A)2 of which Theorem 18 claims that it coincides with IO(A)2. Hence, we are
done if we can show that the optimal set of ALP t converges to the optimal set of ALP.







Here, ht 2 IR
Z(a)
+ . The following lines of argumentation copies the one just after table
(9), so details are omitted. Assume that ht converges to h. Then:
h = ¡¯ s +
m X
i=0
¯ ci ¯ Di¢ for some ¯ c 2 IR£ IR
M: (12)
We have that ht
i > 0 for large t and all i 2 C(h). Columns corresponding to elements of
C(h) are removed from the tables ALP t and ALP without changing optimal sets.
Denote the matrices ¯ Dt and ¯ D of which the redundant columns have been deleted by
ˆ Dt and ˆ D respectively. Similarly, let ˆ ev 2 IR
Z(h) be the ﬁrst unit vector of IR
Z(h), let
ˆ s 2 IR
Z(h) be the restriction of ¯ s. Omit the redundant columns in equation (12):
¯ 0 = ¡ˆ s +
m X
i=0
¯ ci ˆ Di¢




















The object vector ¡ˆ s manifests to be a linear combination of the rows of ˆ Dt. Hence, the
linear function h¡ˆ s;¢i is constant on the polytope F t := fx 2 IR
Z(h)





say kt := h¡ˆ s;xi for all x 2 F t. Add to all rows of ALP t but the ﬁrst, the equation

















22Observe that the constraint matrix of this description is no longer dependent on t.
Conclusion: we have found a description of the form ( ˆ Dx = dt, x > 0) of the optimal
set of ALP t and a description ( ˆ Dx = (1;0;:::;0), x > 0) of the optimal set of ALP.
Apply Claim 21 and conclude the validity of Theorem 18. ¤
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